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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that there is a strong role for empirical analysis to be used to address 
fundamental normative questions. Using human rights as an example, the article shows that 
the evolution of the international regime of human rights provides a standard against which 
country level performance can be both judged and explained through the application of 
empirical approaches in comparative politics. It argues further that different kinds of human 
rights measures (events, standards, surveys, and official statistics) and comparative methods 
(large-N, small-N and single-country studies) offer systematic ways in which to map, explain, 
and understand the variation in human rights abuse around the world. In this way, the 
comparative politics of human rights is prime example of how the ‘is’ of the world can be 
used to address the ‘ought’ of international human rights theory, philosophy, and law. The 
example of human rights analysis in comparative politics shows a strong role for value-based 
and problem-based research that remains systematic in its approach while at the same 
producing outputs that are of public value. 
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Introduction 
In late 1989, I was working in the photographic laboratory in the Lauinger Library at 
Georgetown University when a Jesuit Priest arrived one morning with a roll of film that he 
wanted us to develop. He asked that we make ten copies of the pictures on the roll. In those 
pre-digital days, my boss and I stood in the darkroom shaking the can, drying the film, and 
then printing the pictures. We were not prepared for what we were about to see. The pictures 
had been smuggled out of El Salvador and were of the scene at the Pastoral Centre of José 
Simeón Cañas Central American University (UCA) where six Jesuit priests along with a maid 
and her daughter were killed.1 The images that confronted us were not what was reported in 
the mainstream press (i.e. that they were simply shot). Rather, we saw the brutal end results 
not only of a ‘simple’ set of extra-judicial killings, but the result of a manner of killing that 
has left an indelible mark on me ever since. The official truth commission in El Salvador 
presented strong evidence that not only had the military given the orders to carry out the 
murders but that the officers involved also engaged in a cover up.2 The facts of the case and 
the images that I developed those many years ago illustrate a basic point about the enduring 
capacity of human beings to do horrible things to one another, which for me led to the 
deontological conclusion that what I saw was morally wrong and which has galvanised my 
commitment to a lifetime of human rights research. 
In 2000, I found myself in João Pessoa, the Eastern most tip of South America for lectures 
and a field visit to the contested countryside in the state of Paraíba, which is dominated by 
agriculture and the production of leather. Our field visit was to the sugar cane fields to the 
West of João Pessoa to meet with officials of the Comissão Pastoral da Terra (Pastoral Land 
Commission, CPT) and activists from the Movimento Sem Terra (Landless People’s 
Movement, MST), where we saw first-hand evidence of the violence associated with the 
struggle for land. The CPT is less confrontational and works with local landless people to 
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secure access to fallow land on which peasants can farm and participate in the market with 
the longer-term goal of establishing legal title to the land. The MST is more radical in its 
approach in occupying land, resisting expulsion, and then cultivating the land with the similar 
goal for achieving legal title. Both organisations have been the subject of armed violence 
from private militias hired by landowners.3 Bullet holes in walls, militia towers with visible 
machine guns, and the human stories of violence provide stark evidence of the reality of the 
struggle and the ongoing human rights violations that are being committed on a regular 
basis.4 This particular set of observations provided the basis for a research project on the 
general relationship between inequality and human rights.5 Brazil generated the hypothesis, 
which was then tested using large-N quantitative comparative methods that not only revealed 
a general set of findings about the relationship between inequality and human rights, but also 
a series of typical cases from different regions in the world where high levels of inequality 
are associated with high levels of human rights abuse. 
I recount these cases not to be overly dramatic but to illustrate the primary motivation behind 
my research agenda in the field of human rights. Real world problems associated with the 
ongoing struggle for greater protection of human rights have been the mainstay topics in my 
own research, which has used different kinds of comparative analysis (large-N, small-N and 
single case studies6) to provide systematic empirical explanations for the variation in human 
rights protection.7 If my work can help explain this variation, then there are policy 
implications that can have concrete impact on the promotion and protection of human rights.8 
In this way, my work in comparative politics is value-oriented, problem-driven, and 
empirically rigorous. While a research orientation that applies empirical methods to 
normative questions is not unique,9 it does represent a turn away from any notion that social 
scientific (or political science) research has to be (or can be) value free, and draws on a deep 
tradition of empirical work that seeks to make social (and political) science ‘matter’.10  
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This kind of research is in keeping with scholars who advocate for empirical approaches to 
normative questions. For example, in Justice as Impartiality, political theorist Brian Barry 
makes the case for an empirical approach in providing systematic assessments of country 
conditions that approximate notions of justice constructed from a Scanlonian ‘original 
position.’ He argues that the closer such conditions approximate the original position, ‘the 
more reason we have to regard the rules that are established and maintained in it as prima 
facie just.’11 In other words, empirical analysis of country conditions can and should be done 
to assess the degree to which an ideal of justice has been achieved; a point which is further 
developed in Why Social Justice Matters.12 In her American Political Science Presidential 
Address, ‘What is Political Science For?’ Jane Mansbridge argues that political science is the 
‘only academic discipline specifically organized to study’... how best to ‘govern ourselves.’13 
Rather than pitting empirical research against normative work, these and other examples 
embody the idea upheld by Max Weber that the choice of problems that are to be studied are 
always ‘value relevant’,14 where scientific inquiry and methodological rigour can help 
address otherwise normative questions. 
I argue in this article that contemporary empirical research on human rights in comparative 
politics uses ideal definitions as delineated in international human rights law as a practical 
‘original position’ against which evidence about the state of well-being and treatment of 
individuals, groups, subnational units and countries are compared. The relative gap between 
the ‘ought’ of the international law of human rights and the ‘is’ of country conditions 
becomes a measurable and comparable object of inquiry for systematic comparative analysis, 
the results of which can inform larger normative questions concerning the advance of human 
rights. For many analysts, systematic analysis of human rights violations is an empirical form 
of ‘speaking truth to power,’15 where such analysis can challenge institutionalised power, 
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reserve domains of authority, and deeply embedded social and political hierarchies that have 
underpinned human rights abuses.16  
To develop this argument the article is presented in five main sections. Section one shows 
that despite the absence of agreed philosophical foundations, human rights have been 
‘constructed’ through a process of consensus building and legalization that has delineated a 
set of categories and dimensions that can be operationalized for comparative analysis. Section 
two uses the case of the murder of the Jesuit priests in El Salvador to illustrate the complexity 
of human rights events, the challenges for measuring and analysing ‘events-based’ data in 
single country studies, and how such studies allow scholars and practitioners to build 
explanations that can ‘travel’ to other country contexts.17 Section three uses the case of Brazil 
to show how insights from field observations can generate hypotheses that can be tested 
through large-N comparative analysis of the kind that has dominated much of empirical 
political science since 1980s.18 Section four charts a course at the ‘meso’ level between 
single-country studies and large-N studies to illustrate the ways in which the comparative 
analysis of carefully chosen cases can take into account the contextual specificities of 
different countries, while yielding inferences about the protection of human rights that apply 
beyond the cases under consideration. The final section argues that the comparative analysis 
of human rights is grounded in a set of epistemological and philosophical assumptions that 
transcend the ‘fact-value’ dichotomies in the social sciences in ways that allow empirical 
methods to challenge the kind of power relations that makes the continued violation of human 
rights and human dignity possible.  
Concepts and Constructions 
The rights tradition predates their modern articulation as human rights and is grounded in 
what remain largely incompatible and contested philosophical arguments and which variously 
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draw on God, nature and reason.19 Contestation and scepticism about human rights centre on 
their origins, the claims for their universality, their hegemony as a global moral discourse, 
their inflation beyond what had been considered a fundamental ‘core,’ and the enforceability 
of particular categories of rights.20 Alongside these different sets of doubts about human 
rights, there are other arguments that see them as a modern ‘construction’ or ‘invention’21 
that developed out of the tradition of citizenship rights, which was then universalised through 
a set of practices and agreements that have yielded the international system for the promotion 
and protection of human rights that we now have today. The history of citizenship is one of a 
struggle for rights, as subjugated populations increasingly articulated their grievances in the 
language of rights and as modern states formed, rights became extended through law and 
enforcement mechanisms that provided greater legal protections to an increasingly wider 
range of rights concerns.22 The general claim for their universality (which one could argue is 
merely a claim and not a fact) has been met with an increasing specification of different kinds 
of human rights and participation of states in the international system for the protection of 
human rights, which provides one kind of empirical evidence for their increasing appeal (See 
Table 1). The current system for the promotion and protection of human rights is thus an 
international version of rights that had long been grounded in the nation state, which are now 
seen as an inherent feature of all human beings by virtue of them being human.23  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Human rights transcend the nation state in terms of individual entitlement to an enjoyment of 
these rights wherever a person may find him or herself, and that opponents of this view tend 
to ‘exaggerate the incommensurability of the ideas prevalent in different societies.’24 They 
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are moral claims accorded legal recognition, where states parties to international human 
rights treaties are obliged to ensure that they respect, protect, and fulfil25 these claims. As 
expressed in international law, they are ‘specific norms that emerged from a political project’ 
that commenced in the aftermath of the First World War and gained traction as an immediate 
consequence of World War II.26 The 1945 Charter of the United Nations endorsed the 
existence and necessity of human rights, and the international human rights regime that has 
emerged since is a ‘deliberately constructed, partial international order’ that consists 
primarily of states that establishes a set of norms prescribing the behaviour of those states 
that become its members.27 The regime focuses on holding governments accountable for their 
policies and practices that affect their citizens. The regime is wholly centred on ensuring the 
protection of human dignity and the prevention of its violation by states.  
This reading of the historical evolution of human rights combines their philosophical status 
with their social, political and legal development, where any final claim to the philosophical 
origins of human rights remains elusive, but a pragmatic claim to their construction does 
not.28 The development of human rights through international law establishes a framework 
and ideal set of conditions that ought to be obtained across the world. The challenge for an 
empirical approach to human rights in comparative politics is to take the overall concept of 
human rights and recognise the attempts of the international community to systematise the 
concept in ways that allow analysts to develop indicators and measures of human rights that 
capture their complexity and variation.29 Capturing the complexity and variation of human 
rights is vital work needed to assess ‘actual conditions’ within and between countries. To 
date, there has been much more focus in comparative politics on developing comparable 
measures of human rights that focus on the respect (and to a lesser degree) the protect 
dimensions of civil and political rights.30 This narrow focus is a function of the philosophical 
and ideological preferences within the discipline and the methodological issues associated 
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with different strategies for measuring human rights.31 There has been a strong tendency in 
the discipline to privilege civil and political rights over economic, social and cultural rights, 
which draws on larger normative theorising around liberal definitions of democracy and the 
‘generations’ arguments around the evolution of human rights.32 While the legal advance of 
human rights has sought to eliminate any hierarchy between them as they have been 
traditionally conceived, strong biases in favour of civil and political rights remain in political 
science.33 
In addition to the conceptual biases in the discipline, there is much variation in focus across 
different attempts to measure human rights. ‘Events-based’ data projects have focused 
primarily on counting and estimating extra-judicial killings, disappearances, torture, and 
arbitrary detention, where the methodological approach to events-based data (see below) has 
not been seen as particularly suitable for measuring violations of economic and social 
rights.34 ‘Standards-based’ data have generated initially to measure a narrow set of civil and 
political rights, but now include some economic and social rights.35 Survey-based measures 
capture perceptions and experiences with different kinds of human rights violations and 
conditions, and have included a broader set of human rights than either the events-based data 
or standards-based data.36 Socio-economic and administrative data are also useful for 
measuring all categories and dimensions of human rights, but are subject to questions of data 
availability and capacity at the country level for data collection and analysis.37 
The focus on specific human rights problems and the associated measures interact with 
different levels of analysis in comparative politics (see Figure 1 below). Single-country 
studies tend to use narrative analysis,38 history, process tracing,39 interpretive analysis and 
other qualitative methods, alongside (or as well as) events-based data, survey-based data, and 
socio-economic and administrative statistics. Small-N comparative studies tend to use 
narrative analysis, comparative history,40 qualitative comparative analysis,41 alongside 
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standards-based, survey-based data and socio-economic and administrative statistics. Large-N 
comparative studies tend to use standards-based data and socio-economic and administrative 
data, where data sets have become increasingly complex to include cross-section (150 ≤ N ≤ 
194) and time-series data (20 ≤ T ≤ 40).42 The next section discusses the contours, 
contributions and challenges of comparative politics at each of these different levels of 
analysis. It begins with single-country analysis, moves to large-N global analysis and then 
considers small-N analysis. 
Building from the ground up 
The case of the murder of the Jesuit Priests in El Salvador in 1989 that opened this present 
article illustrates a range of challenges associated with the systematic analysis of human 
rights in comparative politics. The details of the case itself emerged from a range of different 
narratives43 about what was discovered on the morning after they were executed.  These 
multiple narratives need to be captured in ways that can then be used for subsequent 
analysis.44 Legal analysis and the kind in which the Truth Commission engages seeks to 
uncover timelines of what transpired and responsibility for who carried out the killings, as 
well as who ordered them in the first place. From a social science perspective, there is a 
larger aim to locate the case in a universe of possible cases45 to make the determination as to 
whether the killings were typical and part of a larger trend, or atypical and a rare example of 
brutality. Social scientific analysis is also dedicated to explaining and understanding the 
killings in the broader context of processes of rational, structural and cultural theories;46 
revolution, counter-revolution, and civil war;47 ideological and religious confrontation; and 
the role of the US in supporting the government of El Salvador at the time; while 
methodologically the case is framed in terms of being a typical instance, a ‘most likely’ case, 
or ‘least likely’ case (see below).48 
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Beyond the larger explanatory aim and methodological value, the case itself is a good 
example of the many challenges facing those seeking to count human rights violations and 
provide the best statistical evidence for subsequent analysis. The ‘event’ itself was comprised 
of several ‘acts’ that were committed by several ‘perpetrators’ against several ‘victims’. 
These words are in quotations to signify their location in a complex array of roles, acts, and 
relationships typical of human rights events. There are one or more victims who suffered one 
or more violations committed by one or more perpetrators. Understanding these ‘one to 
many’ and ‘many to one’ relationships and the kind of deconstruction of the ‘grammar’ (i.e. 
‘who did what to whom’) of a human rights event have proved essential in data projects that 
seek to capture, aggregate and analyse large-scale human rights violations committed in 
single countries.49 Failure to disaggregate such events as these where the individual violation 
itself is primary unit of analysis can lead to significant undercounting of violations that have 
happened, as well as an over-representation of other violations that have been counted.50  The 
‘who did what to whom model’ as it has become known has made a huge contribution to the 
work of truth commissions around the world whose mandate has been to provide as complete 
a picture as possible of past atrocities and large scale violation of human rights.51 The method 
has also been applied to the estimated number of killings that have taken place in Syria52 
since the advent of the Arab Spring and in a report on the past wrongs of the Habré 
government in Chad.53 In the case of Peru, the model yielded a set of unexpected inferences 
about the conflict between 1980 and 2000, which showed that the Shining Path revolutionary 
group was responsible for 46% of the total estimated killings (61,007 ≤ N ≤ 77,552) and the 
government for 30%, while further analysis showed differences in the use of violence from 
both groups that varied by geography and ethnicity.54 
Any systematic comparative analysis of human rights must acknowledge the value and 
complexity associated with using single-country studies for making large inferences. A well 
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selected and well framed single-country study can make a valuable contribution to our 
understanding of why and under what conditions particular sets of human rights are violated. 
Any intentional selection of a single country study must also ‘locate’ the country both in 
terms of theory and research design.55 A theory of the conditions under which gross human 
rights violations are more likely to be carried out can be tested through careful case selection. 
If the expected outcome is observed then the evidence supports the theory. If the expected 
outcome is not observed then the theory is infirmed. The selection of the case is not made, in 
this instance, on the outcome that is to be explained, but the explanatory factors that have 
been identified from the theory.56 A single case is unlikely to prove a theory definitively, 
even if the number of observations has been raised through the collection and analysis of 
individual or subnational level data (e.g. events, surveys and/or socio-economic and 
administrative data). Single country analysis can, however, provide the basis for generating 
hypotheses (see next section) that are then tested through the analysis of a larger number of 
countries, confirming and infirming theories, and analysing ‘deviant’ cases or ‘outliers’ from 
large-N quantitative analysis. 
 
Going global  
Like the case of El Salvador, the case of Brazil comprises a highly complex set of issues 
relating to human rights. My travels in the Northeast provided me with the opportunity to use 
Brazil to generate hypotheses about the relationships between different measures of 
inequality (income and land) and the violation of physical integrity rights. The disparities in 
land and income distribution in Brazil and the narratives and anecdotal evidence about 
violence committed against the least well off in Brazilian society (in the urban and rural 
sectors) led me to derive the following argument: 
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[A]t a micro level, there are incentives for the ‘‘haves’’ in society to engage in rent-
seeking behaviour within governmental institutions, to maintain control of their 
resources, and to exclude access to those resources by the ‘‘have nots’’ in ways that 
use coercive means that undermine the protection of personal integrity rights … The 
distribution, accumulation, and defence of resource allocation at the micro level is 
historically driven and when aggregated to the macro level suggests that the means for 
maintaining these patterns of distribution may well include violations of civil liberties 
and personal integrity rights. Moreover, in the context of many lesser-developed 
countries, there can be state complicity and even collaboration in acts of coercion. We 
thus expect to find empirical support for a general relationship between inequality and 
human rights illustrated through our discussion of the Brazilian case.57 
 
From this basic premise, the analysis built a multivariate empirical model analogous to the 
burgeoning political science literature that uses large-N quantitative analysis to explain the 
variation in the protection of human rights. The early studies in this subfield use simpler data 
sets and concentrate on domestic socio-political variables (regime type, international war, 
civil war, development, ideology, etc.) that account for the variation in the protection of civil 
and political rights.58 Subsequent studies use more complex data sets and additional domestic 
and international explanatory variables, which take into account such issues as direct foreign 
investment, structural adjustment loans, foreign aid, international treaty ratification, the 
presence of NGOs, membership of IGOs, globalisation and trade, among other factors.59  
In the case of inequality and human rights, the analysis found that even after controlling for 
other factors, there is indeed a significant relationship between high levels of income and 
land inequality on the one hand and the violation of physical integrity rights on the other. The 
relationship is stronger for income than land, where the analysis shows that Brazil is a typical 
case with high levels of inequality and significant problems with the systematic violation of 
physical integrity rights. It also shows that Brazil is joined by other typical cases such as Peru 
and Guatemala in Latin America; Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe in Africa; and India, Pakistan and the Philippines in Asia. This ‘conversation’ 
across different levels of analysis in comparative politics, far from being a problem of 
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‘separate tables,’60 is a fruitful way to locate specific country cases in larger empirical 
patterns that can be analysed statistically. 
Beyond this particular example and the methodological leverage gained from looking across 
levels of analysis, the large-N quantitative analysis of human rights is an exemplar of the 
empirical approach for which Barry advocates. It uses international human rights standards to 
derive a discrete set of human rights measures that are then compared across a large sample 
of countries and time with the purpose of analysing the degree to which country conditions 
meet the international standard and the degree to which different country conditions explain 
the deviation from this standard. In this way, large-N quantitative approaches show that 
‘valid comparisons can be made between and among different countries to examine 
empirically the universal claims for human rights that are made normatively.’61 The 
identification of factors that account for the variation in human rights tells us something 
about what can be done to improve human rights performance. For example, the estimation of 
marginal effects for variables such as land and income inequality suggest that human rights 
protection could be improved through policies of redistribution. 
Meso-methods  
While large-N quantitative methods have a number of advantages for providing explanations 
for the variation in particular sets of rights, they have a number of limitations that make them 
less appropriate for different sets of rights (i.e. those that are not as susceptible to ‘standards-
based’ scales), less appropriate for different kinds of explanatory variables (e.g. social 
mobilisation, advocacy campaigns, long historical processes of change, among many others), 
and less able to capture country-level contextual specificities on the lived experience of 
individuals, shared understandings at the gross roots level of human rights, and the 
comparative historical evolution in the promotion and protection of human rights. Small-N 
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comparative analysis can thus redress some of the limitations of large-N analysis and enrich 
our explanations and understanding of human rights across countries and time. The greater 
attention to local context, however, does not mean we need to sacrifice the inferential logic of 
systematic comparative inquiry.62 Rather, we can harness the logic of inquiry through a 
careful selection of cases that are to be compared in ways the preserve some of the key 
analytical strengths of quantitative methods while at the same time remaining attentive to the 
history and culture of individual countries. Boolean approaches developed by Charles Ragin63 
and others try to combine the rich detail of small-N analysis with the rigour of algebra to 
identify combinations of factors that contribute to outcomes of interest. The work on 
revolutions for example has fruitfully applied this approach.64 
The key challenge in conducting small-N analysis centres on the fact that all such studies 
engage in the intentional selection of cases, which can introduce bias and indeterminacy both 
of which can significantly limit the types of inferences made possible through comparison. In 
my view, the best methodological publication to date on case selection (which itself draws on 
very strong precedents,65 including J.S. Mill66) is the Mahoney and Goertz piece on what they 
call ‘the possibility principle’.67  Previous analytical frameworks on small-N analysis have 
focused on research design strategies that compare similar outcomes across very different 
countries (i.e. the ‘most different systems design’, or MDSD), compare different outcomes 
across similar countries (i.e. the ‘most similar systems design, or MSSD), or some 
combination of the two. These methods hold constant key variables within countries, while 
allowing variation in other variables in ways that could be used to support particular 
empirical explanations. These approaches tend to focus on large macro-variables such as 
different regime types, social revolutions, social protest, and democratic transitions.68  
Mahoney and Goertz, however, have shown that selection without reflection can produce a 
series of studies that suffer from indeterminate research designs that despite having 
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compelling findings require analysis of additional cases in order to confirm them. Their 
‘possibility principle’ argues that for any research topic (and here I include the analysis of 
human rights), there is a universe of possible cases to be considered, a smaller selection of 
relevant cases, and a final selection of cases that feature in the analysis. This final selection is 
non-random, but is informed by the research question itself and the theoretical framework of 
the analysis, which is used to derive a set of what King, Keohane and Verba call ‘observable 
implications.’69  The combination of the research question and theory are a powerful way to 
identify a set of possible cases for small-N analysis, including what Mahoney and Goertz call 
‘positive’ cases, ‘negative’ cases, ‘disconfirming’ cases, ‘irrelevant’ cases,’ and those cases 
that are ‘impossible’ but may well occur.70 
This framework is ideal for empirical analysis of the variation in human rights abuse across a 
small number of countries. For example, human rights abuse can be severe in some countries 
and time periods (e.g. the authoritarian period in Latin America between the 1960s and 
1980s), less severe in other countries and time periods (e.g. post war Europe and the period of 
EU enlargement), or under contestation through periods of rapid political change (e.g. the 
Arab Spring countries since late 2010). In these examples, country level conditions can be 
compared to provide explanation for why human rights are or are not systematically abused, 
where the analysis can take into account some of the key variables that have not been 
specified in large-N analysis. Rational, structural and cultural theories about why human 
rights are abused (or not) can narrow down the universe of cases to a selection of possible 
and relevant cases for controlled comparisons in ways that leave degrees of freedom and 
‘property space’ for the variables of interest to vary, while keeping the overall number of 
cases manageable. 
There are a number of examples from comparative politics in which small-N research design 
has provided new sets of inferences about the conditions under which certain sets of human 
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rights can be more realised more fully. My own work with XXXXXX compared social 
movement activity and the protection of citizenship rights both in principle and in practice 
across the four cases of authoritarian Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Spain to uncover domestic 
processes of political and legal change.71 Case selection was carried out on the basis of 
identifying liberalising authoritarian regimes that had an element of social mobilization. In 
The Power of Human Rights ‘couplets’ of country cases from different regions in the world 
were compared for the relative progress in the realisation of human rights protection as a 
function of linkages between mobilization from domestic NGOs and support from 
transnational advocacy networks.72 The comparisons in this study corroborated and extended 
the findings in our own study through examining the transnational dimension in the struggle 
for human rights. In Insincere Commitments, Smith-Cannoy compares the sequencing of 
commitment and compliance with respect to international human rights across the cases of 
Slovakia, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Her selection of cases is based on initial 
quantitative analysis of treaty ratifications in which Eastern European and Central Asian 
countries stand out as having high rates of ratification and formal acceptance of those 
provisions that provide third party oversight of state practices. Her comparisons show how 
relatively ‘cheap’ international commitments to human rights actually empowered local 
organisations to use specific provisions within human rights treaties to bring about 
progressive change.73 
Taken together, comparative methods and their associated measures of human rights offer 
rich opportunities for explaining and understanding human rights problems. Figure 1 is a 
formal delineation of the different options within comparative research methods for studying 
human rights. The figure shows first that there is a trade-off between the scope of countries 
under comparison (1 ≤ N ≤ 194) and the conceptual ‘ladder of abstraction’, which refers to 
the degree to which particular concepts are able to ‘travel’ across different country contexts.74 
16 
	
Human rights advocates argue that international human rights concepts apply universally, but 
there is still the need for conceptual ‘stretching’ when applying universal standards to country 
level practices. Each category of comparative method has associated measures of human 
rights that are typically deployed, as well as particular kinds of research methods, where more 
qualitative and interpretative approaches are possible in those studies that feature a smaller 
number of countries. As the number of countries and complexity of variables increases, there 
is a natural tendency to push the analysis into the use of quantitative approaches. Even among 
studies on single countries, the use of events-based data and the ‘who did what to whom’ 
models involve large and complex data sets that combine multiple sources of data and 
methods of statistical estimation. 
Figure 1 about here 
Norms, Values and Empirics 
This article began with two descriptive portraits of human rights problems in El Salvador in 
1989 and Brazil in 2000 as a way to highlight how country conditions motivate empirical 
research. In the case of human rights, the empirical research, methods of analysis and 
measures of human rights discussed here are all ways in which human rights scholars and 
practitioners have been seeking to address larger normative concerns relating to human well-
being, the relationship between the state and individual, and broader questions of rights and 
responsibilities. The idea of using empirical methods to address normative questions is not 
new, but is one that has fallen out of fashion with rise of increasingly scientific approaches to 
studying the political world.  But the ‘ought’ of normative theory should map out a set of 
desirable outcomes and ways of organising modern societies the conditions for which can be 
analysed, as I have sought to show here, through the evidence-inference methodological core 
of comparative politics. The mapping of methods and measures, however, has shown that it is 
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no simple matter to assess and compare country conditions in ways that inform our normative 
theories. Rather, questions of information, source material, conceptual coding schemes, 
measurement strategies, issues of research design, case selection, and analytical approaches 
require very careful consideration before embarking on the empirical analysis of normative 
questions. Failure to address these key questions that underpin rigorous empirical analysis 
may mean that providing explanation and understanding of how to achieve our desirable 
outcomes remains elusive. 
In the field of human rights, the ‘ought’ has itself been hotly contested philosophically, and 
laterally delineated through advocacy and consensus building through the legalisation and 
codification of internationally recognised human rights.75 Any attempt to enumerate the 
complete set of human rights that ought to be protected yields lists that range between 40 and 
the 60 rights,76 which complicates efforts to analyse them empirically. The sheer complexity 
of the killing of the Jesuit priests and their colleagues in El Salvador at this micro-level of 
analysis shows the challenges associated with this kind of work. In short, empirical analysis 
of what Barry calls ‘the actual conditions’ in a country is not at all straightforward.77  
This challenge of assessing actual conditions affects a wide range of human rights projects, 
where the application of rigorous methods of analysis can lessen the gap between known and 
unknown information, and provide the basis for the most reasonable assessment of ‘actual 
conditions.’ Far from avoiding value-based and problem driven research, human rights 
scholars and practitioners are now more than ever engaging in empirical analysis of real 
world problems. The motivation for this work is progressive. It seeks to explain and 
understand the conditions under which violations of human rights take place with a view to 
preventing their violation in the future. The desirable outcomes are the purvey of the 
philosopher and lawyer, while the means through which they are obtained are the purvey of 
empirical researchers. Only through attention to fundamental questions of methods and 
18 
	
measures of the kind outlined here, can the field of human rights analysis continue to develop 
and continue to make a contribution to the realisation of those conditions most conducive to 
human dignity and human equality.
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Table 1. State Ratification of the Main International Human Rights Treaties 
Name of Human Rights Treaty Parties 
(N) 
Parties 
(%) 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 167 86% 
1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)  
160 82% 
1966 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)  
175 90% 
1979 Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) 
 
187 96% 
1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT) 
 
149 76% 
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 193 99% 
1990 Convention on Migrant Workers 45 23% 
2006 Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities 111 57% 
Source: http://www.bayefsky.com accessed on 08 January 2014 
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Figure 1. Comparative methods, human rights measures and trade-offs 
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